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Abstract The ethical issues neuroscience raises are subject to increasing attention,
exemplified in the emergence of the discipline neuroethics. While the moral
implications of neurotechnological developments are often discussed, less is
known about how ethics intersects with everyday work in neuroscience and how
scientists themselves perceive the ethics of their research. Drawing on observation
and interviews with members of one UK group conducting neuroscience research
at both the laboratory bench and in the clinic, this article examines what ethics
meant to these researchers and delineates four specific types of ethics that shaped
their day-to-day work: regulatory, professional, personal and tangible. While the
first three categories are similar to those identified elsewhere in sociological work
on scientific and clinical ethics, the notion of ‘tangible ethics’ emerged by
attending to everyday practice, in which these scientists’ discursive distinctions
between right and wrong were sometimes challenged. The findings shed light on
how ethical positions produce and are, in turn, produced by scientific practice.
Informing sociological understandings of neuroscience, they also throw the
category of neuroscience and its ethical specificity into question, given that
members of this group did not experience their work as raising issues that were
distinctly neuro-ethical.
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Introduction
Ethical issues surrounding neuroscience are currently the subject of interest across numerous
disciplines. This article explores the meanings of ethics that emerged through studying the
experiences of one group of researchers working in translational neuroscience. It aims to
contribute to our understanding of how ethical positions produce and are produced by
scientific practice. In so doing, it builds on sociological work on ethics that emphasises the
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importance of studying ‘how ethics are ‘‘done’’ in everyday life (Haimes 2002: 99). At the
same time, we aim to contribute an empirically grounded analysis of ethics in neuroscience.
While there has been much discussion of the ethical issues that neuroscience raises, little is
known about how ethics intersects with day-to-day practice in this field and how scientists
themselves perceive the ethics of their work.
Drawing on observation and interviews with members of a UK group conducting basic
and clinical neuroscientific research, the article examines what ethics meant to these
researchers and delineates four specific types of ethics that shaped their day-to-day work:
regulatory, professional, personal and tangible ethics. Before presenting these findings, we
discuss existing work in two key areas: the ethics of neuroscience and empirical work in
sociology on ethics.
Ethics of neuroscience
Neuroscience is one of the most active areas of biomedicine in terms of public visibility,
research funding, output and, arguably, scientific progress (Pickersgill 2011, Vrecko 2010).
As the field has gained prominence the ethical issues associated with neuroscience have begun
to receive greater scrutiny. Scholarly analysis has been spearheaded by the discipline of
neuroethics, which focuses on the ethical implications of neuroscientific developments,
including neuroimaging, neuropharmacological enhancement and neurostimulation (Racine
2010), in addition to the implications of such neurotechnologies for how we understand
ethics (Roskies 2002). While examining the ethical implications of neuroscience is valuable,
Pickersgill (2012) points out that this focus overlooks the role that ethics plays in configuring
neuroscience itself. To date, few studies have included neuroscientists as research participants
with the aim of exploring how ethics comes into their everyday work.
Several such studies focus specifically on neuroimaging. Illes et al.’s (2010) survey found
that North American researchers involved in neuroimaging rated patient confidentiality and
consent, external influences on academic research, conflicts of interest and participants’
vulnerability and expectations as important issues in their work. Managing incidental
findings on brain scans can be problematic (Deslauriers et al. 2010) and there is variability in
how such findings are dealt with (Illes et al. 2004). Robillard et al. (2011) focused on ethical
issues for researchers working on neurodegenerative disorders. Drawing on Illes et al.’s
(2010) survey to construct their questionnaire, they also found that confidentiality and
consent, and the influence of external factors were important. Several respondents
commented on ethical issues in animal research in a free-text section of the questionnaire,
which Robillard et al. acknowledge was not designed to explore work with animals or cells,
although these were the respondents’ most common research subjects.
Pickersgill (2012) goes further in terms of explaining how ethics manifests itself in day-to-
day neuroscience. Drawing on focus groups with UK neuroscientists, he argues that science
and ethics are co-produced, each embedded in and shaping the other, being mediated
through the emotions and experiences of researchers and their relationships with others.
The participants identified dealing with incidental findings as their principal ethical concern,
along with collaboration with countries seen as less ethical, patient confidentiality and the
upstream implications of neuroscientific work. Pickersgill’s participants were mostly
involved in human subject research, and the way that ethics intersects with other kinds of
neuroscientific work, such as at the laboratory bench, is not specifically discussed. Our
article adds to this small body of work by examining the ethical issues of relevance to a
translational neuroscientific group involved in both human and more basic research, and
by documenting the various forms of ethics that manifested in practice in their everyday
work.
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Empirical ethics in sociology
Critiques of bioethics as relying too much on abstract philosophical reasoning and too little
on empirical investigation (Hedgecoe 2004) have prompted the development of empirical
ethics, an area that offers rich potential for social scientific input. A number of sociological
studies already contribute to this interdisciplinary project by elucidating ‘the social processes,
meanings and institutions that frame and produce ‘‘ethics’’ and ‘‘ethical problems’’ (Haimes
2002: 110) in scientific and clinical settings. We build on this work on biomedical
professionals’ experiences of ethics by extending it to neuroscience. Three key findings from
prior research are of relevance here: ethical boundary-work enables practitioners to respond
pragmatically in contentious areas; regulation does not map neatly onto practice and
professional roles shape ethics.
Previous work illustrates the ways in which ethical boundary-work can be used to reach
workable solutions in contested scientific areas (Ehrich et al. 2006, Frith, Jacoby, and
Gabbay 2011, Hobson-West 2012, Wainwright et al. 2006a). This research draws on Gieryn’s
(1983) concept of boundary-work and shows that beyond differentiating science from non-
science, researchers draw boundaries within science, reflexively ordering practices along a
spectrum from ‘more’ to ‘less’ ethical. As well as helping to maintain science’s public image,
this enables scientists to reach practical solutions in ethically contentious areas. For example,
Wainwright et al. (2006a) show how embryonic stem cell scientists constructed some sources
of embryos as more ethical than others and drew lines around which embryos they were
personally willing to work with. By deferring to regulatory frameworks, scientists were able
both to present themselves as ethical scientists who were following the rules and to progress
their work without being hindered by ethical concerns. This finding has been replicated
several times, leading (Frith et al. 2011: 579) to argue that ‘displacement of responsibility’
when working in highly regulated science is a recognisable repertoire of boundary-work.
Despite this widespread deferral to regulation, another recurring finding is that regulation
does not map neatly onto practice. Professionals may act according to their personal values
when these are less permissive than the regulations. For example, Wainwright et al. (2006a)
found many UK scientists were unwilling to work with embryos created for research
purposes, even though this is permitted in the UK. Professional roles can also play a key role
in shaping ethics. Cribb et al. (2008) show how, in translational stem cell research, the
scientists and doctors they interviewed had different perceptions of what mattered and how
research should be conducted. The differing epistemological orientations, communities of
practice and institutional and regulatory structures of science and medicine resulted in a
‘division of ethical labour’ (p. 53), where each group had separate ethical concerns. Similarly,
Birke et al. (2007) identify a division of emotional labour among laboratory staff involved in
animal experimentation, whereby technicians and research scientists have differing amounts
of contact with the animals and different feelings towards them. These studies illustrate how
professionals working in contested biomedical areas typically draw simultaneously and
reflexively on various sources of ethical guidance, including personal, professional and
regulatory spheres. As will be discussed, the neuroscientists in our study were also guided by
these influences, and additionally, we argue, were confronted with a fourth moral sphere in
the form of tangible ethics.
One gap in existing studies is that they tend to focus on how boundaries are drawn at a
discursive level and the positions researchers take on working with contentious entities or
experimental therapies. They tell us less about how, in practice, ethical boundaries shape
individuals’ day-to-day work and vice versa (Hobson-West 2012: 13). While several of the
above-mentioned studies report using observation, only interview data are generally
discussed. Little is said about how the various moral frameworks clinicians and scientists
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report drawing on are negotiated and applied in real time, how they relate to the physical
setting of the laboratory or clinic and whether there are other ethical spheres at play whose
influence is not articulated. With regard to work on the embryo, Harvey and Ehrich (2011)
have called for a consideration of the embryo itself as an actor in its own ethical
configuration. Attempting to move beyond analyses of how embryos are constructed by staff,
they argue that embryos are better understood as ‘socially contingent, material agents that
cannot be regarded as entirely passive’ (2011: 12). Incorporating the material into analyses of
ethics – an approach that potentially has applicability beyond the embryo – requires
attending much more closely to the daily practices of laboratories and clinics, as scholars in
anthropology (for example, Franklin and Roberts 2006) and science and technology studies
(for example, Latour 1987) have done.
Similarly, it is seldom clear in prior sociological work on ethics whether what counts as
ethics is grounded in an analysis of practice or is defined according to interviewees’
understandings. In this article we unpack this distinction by exploring how ethics was
understood by participants and by analysing how ethics acted and was enacted within the
activities of the study site. We draw on fieldwork conducted in one research group that works
on both Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Huntington’s disease (HD). Our study forms part of a
larger research programme on translational neuroscience that is investigating the ethical,
clinical, scientific and legal landscapes of translational research in contrasting neurological
conditions.
Methods
The setting is a UK university-based research group with around 18 scientific and clinical
members, situated in a neuroregenerative research centre. The group, led by a clinician-
scientist, aims to increase understanding of the aetiology and features of PD and HD and to
develop therapies via an array of approaches ranging through pharmacological to genetic to
cell-based experimental treatments. One of the largest projects at the time of fieldwork
involved research into foetal brain tissue grafts as a therapy for PD, with the goal of moving
from in vitro and in vivo animal work to a clinical trial in the near future. Both bench and
bedside research is conducted, with one of the central goals of the group being translation
between these domains. The layout of the building reflects this purpose: on one floor is a
clinic where PD and HD patients come for assessment and to take part in research; on
another are the labs where bench science is undertaken. There is a circulation of cells and
tissue, patients and staff between the research centre and a nearby hospital. The staff work
mostly in either the lab (undertaking cell, tissue and animal behavioural research) or the
clinic (conducting neuropsychological and genetic testing of patients and running drug
studies). The lab side of the group includes both pure scientists and some people with clinical
training; the clinic side involves a mix of backgrounds, from medicine, neuroscience and
psychology to clinical trial management. The group comes together for a weekly lab meeting
during which one person reports on their project.
Data collection was conducted by CB (the first author) between September 2010 and April
2011, comprising observation that preceded and ran concurrently with interviews.
Observation included observing cell and tissue-based work at the bench, patient cognitive
testing and team meetings. Observation was crucial for understanding team members’ varied
roles and daily experiences. In all, 13 interviews were conducted with team members
including the group leader, split between the lab and the clinic. A group leader from another
group in the centre was also interviewed to add an additional perspective from a senior
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neuroscientist. Interviews lasted 1 hour on average and were recorded and transcribed.
Interviewees were asked general questions about their background and motivation for
working in the area; what ethical issues they encountered; the relationship between the
laboratory and the clinic and how they felt about the activities they were involved in. These
latter questions were drawn from the observation data where possible, hence interviews and
observation were tightly connected. Data were thematically analysed using NVivo as a way
to structure the data and all the research team contributed to the generation of the identified
themes. To protect the identities of our informants we classify them here as either lab
researchers (LR) or clinic researchers (CR).
Findings
As with previous studies, there were a number of different ethical or moral spheres that
shaped and were embedded in the daily work of this neuroscientific research group.
Individual researchers drew on these different influences in a reflexive manner that assisted
them in reconciling challenging or contradictory moral interpretations of their work.
However, some spheres had more legitimacy than others. Figure 1 depicts four key ethical
spheres emerging from the data – regulatory, professional, personal, and a new category,
tangible ethics – and their order of influence in the research setting. Each sphere is discussed
in turn.
Regulatory ethics
It soon became clear in both the observation and interviews that the dominant meaning of
ethics in the group was the external regulatory approvals required to conduct research with
patients, human tissue or animals. For studies involving patients and human tissue, approval
has to be granted by a National Health Service research ethics committee. Scientific work
with animals is licensed and monitored by the UK Home Office. The word ‘ethics’ had
Regulatory
ethics
Professional
ethics
Personal
ethics
Tangible
ethics
Figure 1: What ethical spheres were drawn on in practice?
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become so synonymous with these approval processes that nearly half of the interviewees
confounded ethics and regulation, as in the following excerpt:
CB: What role do ethical concerns play in how you set up the research?
CR2: I don’t think it really affected anything I do. It made me think about things that I
wouldn’t have otherwise thought about, like insurance and what happens if things
go wrong… But in terms of the actual study, I think I just set it up as I wanted to
do it, and then obviously sent it off to Ethics and it was all fine. So there was
nothing that Ethics and the ethical procedure stopped me from doing that I
wanted to do.
LR2 distinguished moral deliberation from ethics committee applications, but recognised
that the latter were more often discussed within the group:
CB: Do you ever discuss ethical issues within the group?
LR2: We discuss ethical application forms! But I think that’s mainly discussion, you
know, how can we make sure the committee approves what we want to do? Rather
than, is what we’re doing ethically correct?
The regulatory ethics process therefore loomed large in these neuroscientists’ minds when
ethics was mentioned, and indeed, regulation was omnipresent in day-to-day practice
(cf. Pickersgill 2012). The various legal acts and ethical guidelines governing work with
humans and animals, as well as project-specific requirements enshrined in ethics committee
approvals, structured almost every aspect of work in the lab and clinic, including which
patients, animals or tissue types could be involved, how they could be accessed, what
procedures could be performed on them, where in the building could such procedures be
carried out, for what duration, who could conduct the research and what training was needed.
At a practical level, therefore, daily tasks were carried out by approved personnel in tightly
bounded ethical spaces.
External ethical regulation also affected the way in which experiments were designed
and the data that were generated. LR4, who was working with HD model mice,
explained that ideally her research would include testing how different treatments
affected the mice’s longevity. However, this was impossible because according to Home
Office regulations the mice had to be killed as soon as they began showing signs of the
disease:
We have to look at when the mouse dies naturally to see the effect of treatment, but it’s not
allowed… As long as they express the [HD] phenotypes, we have to kill them. And if they
have very little symptoms, the Animal House ring us, and ‘Please kill the mice now’.
In addition to shaping research practices, ethical regulation was a major actor in the group’s
work in terms of the time spent discussing ethics applications, applying for ethical approvals
and maintaining related paperwork. In the lab meetings observed, ethics committee
approvals were frequently discussed and many interviewees lamented the time they had to
devote to the administrative work related to regulation. However, as Hobson-West (2012: 8)
also reports from interviews with another group of scientists, some group members felt that
the process of putting together ethics applications was helpful in terms of having to think
through research plans in advance. CR4 was one of several who saw the regulatory ethics
process itself as integral to good research:
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CR4: I think with ethics these days, you can’t really get away with that much now
anymore. Compared to 10 years ago, the ethics forms are vastly different. They
used to be about three pages long and now they’re 93 pages!
CB: Do you think that actually makes things more ethical?
CR4: I think, yes, it does. Before you basically gave a brief summary of the research
that you were going to do … Now, you have to state exactly what you’re
doing, why you’re doing it, when you’re doing it, and how long you’re doing
it for. And I think that does make people really question and consider why
they’re doing things.
So the fact that ethics was often understood to mean external ethical regulation should not be
viewed as erroneous on the part of these neuroscientists, nor as insignificant. It reflects the
actual constitution of practice in the group, in which regulation affected almost every aspect
– from the conceptualisation of experiments to their conduct – and the way that these
researchers had learned to think ethically. Regulation set a rigid ethical space within which
practice took place. However, within that space other ethical spheres also operated and other
boundaries were drawn, and we now look at the influence of what we have called
professional ethics.
Professional ethics
Cribb et al. (2008) have shown how the contrasting professional roles of doctors and
scientists can lead to somewhat different moral viewpoints in translational research. We
found that it was day-to-day practices and the space in which they were carried out that
framed staff members’ ethical concerns, rather than professional roles per se. Staff worked
mainly in either the lab or the clinic, although in each subgroup there was a mix of
professions and roles, with some lab scientists having a medical background and some clinic
staff having trained in basic sciences. It was striking, however, that individual group
members self-identified as belonging to either the lab or the clinic part of the group and
perceived quite a sharp divide between them. CR1, for example, described the situation and
the weekly lab meeting as follows:
Every week someone presents their own work, but you tend to find that lab people will
comment on lab techniques, because the clinic people won’t know any of the lab
techniques… then when clinic people present, it’s other clinic people who comment on it. I
think in terms of [group leader], he’s got a great sense of both and he links the two in his
own mind. But I wouldn’t say there’s a great link really. I mean you don’t even get to
know people’s names upstairs [in the lab].
A boundary was therefore constructed by group members between the lab and the clinic,
with each domain seen as epistemologically distinct. Other researchers have explored the two
cultures of the lab and clinic (Martin et al. 2008, Wainwright et al. 2006b, Wilson-Kovacs
and Hauskeller 2011), but what is significant here is that this division persisted even in a
single research group whose self-defined goal was translation. The same boundary was used
to mark out the division of ethical labour, as each subgroup felt that they had specific ethical
issues that pertained to their domain. Ethical concerns in the clinic subgroup centred on the
overburdening and inconveniencing of patients participating in research studies. In contrast,
ethical issues in the lab were seen to centre on animals and the foetus. Strikingly, when asked
if there were any common ethical issues in the group as a whole, none of the interviewees
thought there were.
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Furthermore, each of the two subgroups constructed the other as having more pressing
ethical concerns than themselves. For example, on CB’s second day of observation, a clinic
researcher told her that two of the lab researchers were the best people to observe because
their work had the most ethical implications. Similarly, CR5, when asked about ethical
issues, commented:
I don’t think I’ve had any major issues so far, because I mean I haven’t been involved in
doing like stem cells or foetal tissue. I know some other people probably are. But no, I
haven’t as yet been involved in that kind of research, so it’s mainly been quite simple with
patients.
Conversely, when asked about the relationship between science and bioethics, LR3 said:
I don’t have too much to do with – I mean, I know that we have ethical permission for
doing our human foetal work… but I suppose I just conform to the part that I need to
conform to and don’t think too much about it otherwise really. So in fact it’s something
that I think of as being more relevant to the clinic than to the lab.
Thus, ethical boundaries were constructed between working with patients and working with
contentious entities such as animals and the foetus. In these discussions, there was virtually
no acknowledgement that the group’s goal was actually to translate one type of practice into
the other. In fact, both lab and clinic group members claimed to know little of the work
going on in the other domain. Birke et al. (2007: 116) note this form of boundary-work
among laboratory staff working with animals and suggest that ‘ignorance’ is a way of
displacing moral responsibility. It may be that by focusing simply on their own daily
practices, researchers in this group were able to delimit their ethical concerns. However, such
boundary-work may have implications for the success of the translational enterprise if, as
Cribb et al. argue, ‘translational research has to be understood as a process of movement and
negotiation across ethical spaces and not simply across physical and social places and spaces’
(2008: 353).
Notably, in neither domain was the fact that they were working in neuroscience considered
ethically significant. When asked generally about ethical issues in their work, only the group
leader and one clinic researcher raised a neuro-specific concern, which was related to
obtaining informed consent from HD patients who may lack capacity. When then asked
directly about ethical issues in neuroscience, the interviewees did not connect these to their
daily work. CR5, for example, asserted that neuroscience created ‘massive’ ethical concerns,
‘just because it’s basically brain, and brain is person, or brain is like mind, and mind is
individual, and then that’s behaviour’. However, when then asked how these issues came into
her work she explained:
They don’t so much, I think, just working – so when I work at [another research centre],
they’re doing research which is touching on all those areas, so the vegetative state work,
the consciousness work, that sort of thing… I was deciding between two PhDs – one in
Parkinson’s, and the other in vegetative state work… I went to meet a couple of vegetative
state patients to see how I’d feel about working with them. And it just left me with so
many questions, and just so kind of heated up, that I just thought I wouldn’t be able to
work with that for three years.
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Here, a boundary was drawn between more and less ethically charged areas of neuroscience.
Interviewees in the lab drew a further boundary between the neuroscience involving patients
and their own work, which they located clearly in the realm of basic science:
LR5: I don’t think neurobiology is anything different from cardiological research or
whatever because I mean – neurology may be different, because in neurology you
can try to manipulate especially the cognitive part of patients.
LR1: To me, what we do is cell work, and cells are cells and it doesn’t matter whether
they’re neurons or liver cells.
In terms of professional ethics then, among these researchers professional identity was linked
closely to the day-to-day practices they carried out individually, rather than to a broader
category of neuroscientist. This enabled them to draw clear boundaries around what was and
was not an ethical issue in their work, the main schism being between concerns in the lab and
the clinic. Just as regulation creates a bounded ethical space and produces particular
practices, so these spaces and practices construct ethical issues that individuals encounter
depending on which space they enter. At the same time, individuals bring their own moral
views to these ethical spaces, developed in other settings; hence day-to-day experiences of
ethics among researchers in this group were further refined via the influence of personal
ethics.
Personal ethics
Of interest here is the degree to which personal beliefs determine practices. In the third layer
of Figure 1 both regulatory and professional spheres were used to demarcate what was and
was not an ethical concern for individuals. Within this framework people also exercised their
own personal ethics, by which we mean individuals’ views about what is right and wrong in
their work. For a minority of participants, the regulations themselves served as their primary
moral compass. LR2, when asked whether there was any research he would not be willing to
do, responded:
I mean I guess the stuff that … would come to mind, would be animal stuff. But I
mean there are so many regulations about what can and can’t be done … you kind of
think to yourself that anything that you could ethically be approved to do, would be
justifiable.
This can be seen to fit within the displacement of responsibility repertoire described by Frith
et al. (2011: 10) and found in other studies (Wainwright et al. 2006a), whereby external
regulation is allowed to do the moral work.
For most interviewees, however, regulation set an upper limit on what practices could be
contemplated but they drew a less permissive boundary in terms of what they personally were
prepared to do. As in previous studies of ethical boundary-work, we found that rather than
simply defining activities as right or wrong, these researchers tended to place practices and
entities on a spectrum and to draw their own personal line at a particular point. LR4 felt that
animal research was justifiable for the benefit of humans, but drew a line at the species she
would work with:
I don’t agree with working with monkeys or other very developed mammals… [Working
with mice] can’t be the best model, but just to think about the monkey, we have to give up
something, and the compromise animals can be mice or rats.
Neuroscientists’ everyday experiences of ethics 1141
 2013 The Authors
Sociology of Health & Illness  2013 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Although many interviewees drew boundaries around what kind of research they were
prepared to do, none indicated that they were unwilling to work in an environment where
such practices took place. This is similar to those professionals Farsides et al. (2004) label
tolerators in their study of antenatal screening – those who are uncomfortable with or
even disapprove of certain practices but are willing to carry them out or to work with
others who do so because of their commitment to another moral principle, such as patient
autonomy. A view expressed by all interviewees in our study was that the group’s research
was being done for the right reasons – to help sick people – and where people were not
willing to carry out certain practices themselves, an attitude of tolerance prevailed, as seen
in this excerpt:
CB: Is there any type of work going on in the group that you personally wouldn’t be
prepared to do?
CR2: Probably animal work actually… I just always stayed away from it, just because I
didn’t know how I’d feel doing it… I don’t think I could even, no – I like to think
it goes on, I like to think people do it, but I couldn’t do it. I think that’s the
bottom line.
As other studies have found, the researchers acted reflexively to create a workable space
between regulatory, professional and personal ethics. People tended to work within the
limits of what was acceptable to them, which in turn was within the limits of the
regulation and the scope of their role. Despite the operation of these various ethical
boundaries though, there were still occasions when staff experienced a sense of doing
wrong in the daily conduct of their work, pointing to a fourth moral sphere that we call
tangible ethics.
Tangible ethics
Here we discuss ways in which ethics manifested in this setting that did not fit into the
previously identified categories. The instances we refer to are situations in which individuals
experienced a dissonance between their personal view that a particular practice was morally
right, and a feeling of wrongdoing when actually carrying it out. That is, the way that ethics
was actually experienced in a tangible way in the workplace was sometimes different from
the researchers’ discursive construction of right and wrong. While other studies report that
health professionals are sometimes upset or uncomfortable while carrying out procedures
that they believe are justified (for example, Harvey and Ehrich 2011, Williams 2006), this
phenomenon has not previously been analysed as a distinct form of ethics. Pickersgill’s
(2012) discussion of the co-production of ethics and emotion in neuroscience refers to the
embedding of ethics in the relationship between the neuroscientist and research participant.
As we show here, emotion-based ethics are also produced when human relationships are
not involved. We use ‘tangible ethics’ to refer to this ethical sphere located at the level of
practice.
One example relates to LR4, who, as described earlier, was required by regulations to kill
the HD mice before her experiment had run its logical course. Commenting on the ethics of
animal work she argued that animal welfare was sometimes given too much consideration at
the cost of human wellbeing: ‘sometimes it’s too restricted, sometimes I feel it’s unnecessary
effort … I think sometimes we have to focus more on treatment’. As seen in the preceding
section, this researcher’s personal ethical boundary specifically sanctioned the use of rodents
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in research. Nevertheless, actually killing the mice – an intrinsic part of animal research – was
experienced as fundamentally wrong:
CB: And are there any aspects of your work that make you uncomfortable?
LR4: Doing the procedure? Well, we have to kill the animal, sometimes, just expose to
CO2, and when I kill four or five mice together, put them in the chamber, CO2
chamber, I was like, World War II, it’s like…
CB: Like the gas chamber
LR4: Yes. So I feel really bad. I avoid killing the mice like that.
CB: How do you avoid it?
LR4: It depends on the experiments, but luckily my plans, mostly I don’t need these
experiments. So I try to make a design not using – but it’s inevitable. So I feel
really, really miserable when I put the mice, four and five together in the
chamber and turn on the CO2 gas. Oh it’s so bad. And where you do it, it’s
quite dark.
The reference to the Holocaust here is a stark indication of how deeply wrong it felt to
actually carry out this procedure. In this case, the scientist indicates that her tangible
experience of wrongdoing fed back into her experimental design, suggesting that tangible
ethics shapes as well as emanates from practice, without necessarily altering the personal
ethical sphere.
A similar kind of distinction between personal and tangible ethics was experienced on
occasion by two of the scientists working with foetal tissue. Their work involved dissecting
six to 10-week-old foetuses in order to obtain a specific part of the brain for use in
experiments. LR1 stated in the interview that her personal view was that the foetus did not
have a special status and therefore she was comfortable doing this work:
I’m fine with it… it’s just tissue that is going to disintegrate and disappear, so if we can use
it, much, much better.
However, it became clear when observing LR1 at work that she did not always see the
foetus as ‘just tissue’ in practice. On one occasion, CB observed LR1 trying to obtain the
required piece of neural tissue from a 10 week-old foetus that had been surgically aborted.
As opposed to medical terminations, when the foetus arrived whole and at an earlier
gestational stage, scientists received the product of surgical terminations as a mix of blood
and pieces of tissue, which they had to sort through to find the foetal brain. The following
took place in a room in the lab with fridges and a laminar flow hood designated for
human tissue work:
LR1 takes three vials filled with tissue and a pinkish bloody fluid out of the fridge, sprays
them and places them under the hood in a stand. She chats to me as she sets about
emptying the vials one by one into Petri dishes and poking around in the tissue with
tweezers to find foetal parts. She is looking for anything white. In the first lot it is mostly
placenta, but then suddenly LR1 exclaims ‘Ay-yi-yi, I think that’s a hand’. She shows me
down the microscope and indeed a small arm and hand is visible, sticking out of the
bloody placental mass. (Field notes, 25 November 2010)
LR1¢s reaction here seemed to indicate that the discursive boundary-work performed when
categorising the foetus as like any other tissue was not always sustainable in practice.
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Furthermore, before CB first observed the dissections, LR1 was at pains to prepare her for
what she was about to see:
LR1 Googles ‘embryo’ and clicks on the first image that appears – an illuminated pale
white embryo floating on a black background with developing arms, legs, ear and eye in
high definition. ‘This is basically what it looks like’, LR1 explains, adding that ‘I always
used to think that the pictures the anti-abortionists use were exaggerated, but actually that
is what they look like’. (Field notes, 16 September 2010)
LR1¢s efforts to prepare CB for the materiality of the work again points to the tangible
aspects of day-to-day ethics. LR3 also reported that it sometimes felt wrong to actually carry
out the dissection:
[Today] we had a quite large nine-week foetus, which was larger than average…
Everything is much more defined and easy to identify. So we were having discussions
about that. And neither of us [LR1 & LR3] are that keen on actually opening up the head,
do you know what I mean? It just seems like a wrong thing to do.
The finding that researchers in this group sometimes experienced a tangible sense of
wrongness, a kind of embodied ethics-at-the-coalface, which was different from their
personal moral views, adds weight to Harvey and Ehrich’s contention that in understanding
the moral landscapes of, in their example, embryo research, there is a need for greater
consideration ‘of how such landscapes could be influenced by the actual topology of the
material facticity of human embryos’ (2011: 6). Like embryos, we argue that the materiality
of the foetus and of animals makes them actors in the constitution of ethical landscapes in
these neuroscientists’ daily work, seen most vividly in the sphere of tangible ethics.
The identification of this tangible form of ethics in some ways challenges the argument that
ethical boundary-work enables researchers to defer or bracket out ethical quandaries in their
work (Ehrich et al. 2006, Wainwright et al. 2006a). While the researchers had well-defined
regulatory, professional and personal ethical boundaries that allowed them to do the work,
there were still sometimes troublesome ethical issues or experiences that manifested in a
tangible way when the work was actually being done. This has some similarities with the
‘yuck factor’ that is used to describe people’s instinctual moral aversion to certain practices
or entities but here it was based wholly in experience rather than on a gut reaction to the
issue. As opposed to a conflict of values that scientists needed to resolve prior to action (as
might occur in the personal ethical sphere), the dissonance between personal and tangible
ethics arose in action, and the two spheres co-existed, as depicted in Figure 1, rather than
becoming incorporated. The role of tangible ethics only really emerged after extended
discussions and observation. It is hidden under the other layers and has barely been discussed
in other studies in the ethics-in-practice tradition of medical sociology.
Discussion and conclusion
This article examines the meanings that ethics takes in the translational culture of a conjoined
neuroscience laboratory and clinic. We demonstrated that participants often interpreted
ethics in terms of externally imposed regulation, and that this kind of ethics did indeed play a
significant role in the whole set-up and conduct of the group’s activities. In practice,
researchers drew on a complex mix of regulatory, professional, personal and tangible ethics
1144 Caragh Brosnan et al.
 2013 The Authors
Sociology of Health & Illness  2013 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/John Wiley & Sons Ltd
when deciding how to do their work. Building on prior conceptualisations of ethical
boundary-work, we suggest that there was a particular order in which boundaries were
drawn in this setting: regulation created an overarching ethical frame into which professional
and personal ethics were then fitted, while tangible ethics only manifested itself while actually
carrying out practices that had been defined as acceptable in the other spheres. The
conceptual schema we have outlined (Figure 1) may offer a useful framework for considering
the way ethics acts and is enacted in other similar settings.
We have also introduced the concept of tangible ethics. The moral qualms researchers
sometimes feel when confronted with the materiality of particular experimental elements
have been noted before but they have never been considered a specific ethical domain. We
found that this fourth ethical sphere acted as a countervailing influence on the other three
and meant that some researchers were not able to fully reconcile ‘doing a good job’ with
‘doing good’. This suggests that, depending on what practices staff are engaged in, ethical
boundary-work is sometimes sustainable only to a certain point, and ultimately ethical
problems have to be faced when it comes to actually doing the work. Ethical boundary-
work is therefore only a partial explanation of how the moral order of the lab ⁄ clinic is
configured.
Although we have offered a taxonomy of ethics, we have treated the terms ethical and
moral as effectively interchangeable, which reflects the usage of our interviewees and much
other usage. Nonetheless, we have sought to make important differentiations around and
under this umbrella category of the ethical-moral; differentiations that, to varying degrees,
intersect with distinctions that are sometimes made – both in everyday discourse and in
theoretical work – between ethics and morals. We have not made use of this terminological
distinction in our analysis because we are conscious that the multiple, and sometimes
conflicting, ways in which it is employed can obscure as much as it clarifies, as Sayer (2011:
16-17) has recently argued. However, it is worth briefly indicating some of the ways in which
the differentiations developed here relate to some versions of the ethics ⁄morality distinction.
The taxonomy can be seen as a map of the scientists’ moral landscape in the sense that
Arthur Kleinman (1999) uses the term; that is, the lived experience of what fundamentally
matters to people who are practically engaged in specific and local contexts, as opposed to
some more abstract, reflective and would-be universalist conception of the normative (ethics,
for Kleinman). Hence, for the same broad reason, our mapping is not about morality in the
sense in which Bernard Williams (1985) uses the word, that is, to pick out a narrow
rationalist focus on overriding obligations as opposed to a more historicised, plural and
thicker interest in a complex of values, purposes and ideals (ethics, for Williams) – indeed,
the latter is much closer to our guiding interest.
Our differentiations do have some loose correspondence with the Foucauldian distinction
between morality and ethics (in which ethics is a subset of morality which, roughly speaking,
picks out the self-making aspects of morality): in broad terms the first two categories in our
taxonomy (regulatory and professional) illuminate aspects of what Foucault (1998) labels
morality and the latter two categories (personal and tangible) illuminate aspects of ethics.
The analysis offered here is not principally concerned with the Foucauldian problematic of
ethics – the business of the subject’s relations to itself – but we believe that the distinction
between personal and tangible ethics helps to contribute an empirically grounded insight into
some of the processes and tensions encountered and experienced in producing oneself as an
embodied ethical subject. In particular, the discovery and examples of tangible ethics in the
data show how visceral-affective elements in ethical life exist alongside, and can ‘push
against’, the cognitive-discursive elements otherwise articulated as personal ethics. More
broadly, it enables us to show how, building on Harvey and Ehrich’s argument (2011),
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attending to the material dimensions of practice in bioscience is a fruitful way to move
sociological empirical ethics forward.
Our study also has implications for sociological research on translation, showing as it does
that the two cultures of the lab and clinic were represented clearly in this one research group.
The group may become more united as the PD clinical trial progresses and there is a clearer
connection between bench and bedside, but at the time of data collection the lab and clinic
were functioning as quite separate epistemological and ethical spaces. Staff maintained
carefully constructed boundaries between what was and was not of ethical relevance to each
area and the few discussions of ethical issues that took place were also within rather than
between the domains. Prior studies have described how ethical boundary-work enables
individual staff to get on with their jobs without being plagued by moral quandaries on a
daily basis. The flipside is that ethical boundary-work may actually impede the translation
process by helping maintain the cultural and epistemological separation of lab and clinic.
Finally, it was striking that despite being conducted in a neuroscientific setting, this study
did not uncover issues that might be classed as particularly neuro-ethical. In fact, members of
this group did not see their work as raising any issues specific to neuroscience. There are
several possible explanations for this. One is that the group’s eschewal of special neuroethical
status is yet another form of boundary-work that enables them to avoid confronting the
ethical questions being raised about neuroscience, by distinguishing themselves from the
neuroscientists whose work raises ‘big’ issues. Another is that we focused on one group
conducting research on two specific neurodegenerative conditions, with only part of their
work involving patients, and it could be argued that such work is unrepresentative of
neuroscience. This, however, raises the question of what neuroscience is. Tracing its origins
genealogically, Abi-Rached and Rose (2010) describe neuroscience as a disciplinary ‘hybrid
of hybrids’ (2010: 12), held together since the 1960s by a common ‘neuromolecular gaze’.
Precisely what neuroscience means today and how it is evolving requires ongoing empirical
investigation. In turn, the object of a specific ethics of neuroscience demands greater
conceptual clarification. Our findings highlight the importance of not only examining the
possible future ethical implications of neuroscience, but of understanding how both ethics
and neuroscience are configured in the present.
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